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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes China's experience under U.S. apparel and textile quotas. It makes use of a unique
new database that tracks U.S. trading partners' performance under the quota regimes established by
the global Multifiber Arrangement (1974 to 1995) and subsequent Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(1995 to 2005). We find that China was relatively more constrained under these regimes than other
countries and that, as quotas were lifted, China's exports grew disproportionately. When the ATC finally
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1. Introduction
On January 1, 2005, restrictions on the fourth and ﬁnal set of textile and clothing
products regulated by the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), the successor of the
Multiﬁber Arrangement (MFA), were removed. The gradual expiration of these quotas
starting in 1995 ended decades of bilateral non-tariﬀ-barrier protection in this industry
and set the stage for a substantial reallocation of production and exports across countries.
Though many analysts expected China’s share of the United States’ textile and clothing
(T&C) imports to rise when the ATC expired in 2005, predictions varied widely.1 In fact,
China’s overall T&C export quantities to the U.S. increased 39 percent in 2005, with exports
of goods whose quotas were relaxed in the beginning of that year jumping 270 percent.
This paper uses a new dataset of U.S. import quotas to examine China’s relative perfor-
mance in the U.S. market under the ATC. Our analysis reveals that China’s T&C exports to
the U.S. were relatively restrained along three dimensions. First, China’s quotas were more
likely to be binding than the quotas imposed on other countries. Second, China’s quotas
grew at a slower rate than the quotas of most other countries. Finally, the U.S. appears
to have placed relatively greater restrictions on China’s ability to shift quota allocations
across diﬀe r e n tc a t e g o r i e so fg o o d so ra c r o s sy e a r s .
China’s rapid increase in U.S. market share as quotas were relaxed came at the expense
of both domestic manufacturers and the United States’ other trading partners. We show
that T&C exports from virtually all countries decreased in 2005, and that for some regions,
e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa, these declines represented an abrupt reversal of several years of
previously robust T&C export growth. These reversals suggest that, over time, the MFA
and ATC had evolved from a regime intended to protect domestic U.S. manufacturers into
one which also guaranteed smaller developing countries access to the U.S. market. Among
developing countries, only those from South Asia managed to defend market share in the
face of substantial Chinese growth, but even South Asia’s response was not uniform across
products.
T&C quotas under the ATC were relaxed in four phases. Though China’s response to
the ﬁnal phase of reductions was dramatic, it was predictable given China’s reaction to
earlier quota relaxations, particularly when one focuses on goods for which China’s quotas
were binding. China, being outside the WTO, was ineligible for the ﬁrst two phases of quota
reductions in 1995 and 1998. After joining the WTO in December 2001, its quotas on these
goods, as well as its quotas on Phase III goods, were lifted simultaneously in January 2002.
The four panels of Figure 1 trace out China’s U.S. exports of T&C goods according to
1For example, the computational general equilibrium (CGE) study by Rivera et al (2003) predicted that
China’s textile and apparel exports would increase between 8 and 104 percent, respectively, following the
elimination of quotas in developed countries. Nordas (2004) predicted that China’s post-MFA/ATC textile
and clothing market share in the U.S. would increase by 7 and 34 percentage points, respectively. Diao and
Somwaru (2001) estimated a more moderate growth of 6 percent in Chinese T&C exports to the world.China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 3
the phase in which quotas were relaxed. Solid lines track the evolution of total exports,
while dashed lines report China’s exports in goods whose quotas were binding the year
before removal. The vertial line in each panel notes the year in which China’s quotas in
each set of goods were relaxed. As indicated in the ﬁgure, China’s exports of Phase I and
II goods increased relatively modestly after quota removal (42 and 32 percent, respectively)
compared with Phase III and Phase IV goods (305 and 271 percent, respectively). China’s
response in previously bound goods, by contrast, was substantially larger across the three
Phases — II, III and IV — in which goods faced binding quotas, increasing 825, 322 and 330
percent, respectively. As we document below, China’s Phase IV growth in 2005 appears to
have had an especially large and negative impact on nearly all regions’ exports that year.
Examination of export price changes under the ATC suggests a reallocation of exports
within as well as across countries as quotas were relaxed. We ﬁnd quota removal to be
accompanied by large declines in export unit values across all U.S. trading partners. In the
ﬁnal phase, China’s unit values in unbound versus bound products fell 31 and 41 percent,
respectively. These declines, as well, were anticipated by previous phases of liberalization.
Consistent with models of quality upgrading in response to quantitative restrictions, we
also document evidence of relative quality downgrading within China’s Phase IV products
as their quotas were lifted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
the MFA and ATC regimes. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the contents of the
U.S. MFA/ATC database constructed for this paper. Sections 4 and 5 examines countries
quantity and unit value responses to quota relaxation. Section 7 concludes.
2. The MFA and the ATC
The Multiﬁber Arrangement grew out of a series of voluntary export restraints im-
posed, initially, by the United States on Japanese textile exports in 1955. By the end
up the 1950s, the United Kingdom also began to limit imports from Hong Kong, India
and Pakistan (Spinanger, 1999). Quotas on cotton textiles and apparel products were ﬁrst
institutionalized with the Short Term Arrangement in 1961, which was extended to two
subsequent Long Term Arrangements throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. As the Asian
economies’ textile and apparel production continued to grow, developed countries sought
a more systematic mechanism to deal with “market disruptions” in other ﬁber markets.
This search lead to the signing of the Multiﬁber Arrangement, in 1974, which, although
“temporary” at ﬁrst, ultimately lead to an additional 30 years of protection. As a result of
the MFA, T&C products were kept out of multilateral trade negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade OrganizationChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 4
(WTO).2
A major development of the Uruguay Round was the signing of the Agreement on Textile
and Clothing (ATC) in 1994. The ATC ended the MFA and began the process of integrating
textile and clothing products into GATT/WTO rules by removing their quotas. Integration
occurred over the four phases outlined in Table 1. During each phase, importing countries
were to integrate a portion of all T&C products covered by the ATC. The particular prod-
ucts integrated in each phase importing-country speciﬁc but subject to two rules. First,
the products retired in each phase had to include goods from all four major textile and
clothing segments, i.e., Yarn, Fabrics, Made-Up textile products (e.g., table linen, carpets
and curtains), and Clothing. Second, the chosen products had to represent a set portion of
each country’s 1990 T&C imports, by volume. In Phase I, which began on January 1, 1995,
countries had to integrate products representing 16 percent of their 1990 import volumes.
An additional 17 and 18 percent of 1990 export volumes were integrated at the beginning of
Phases II and III on January 1, 1998 and January 1, 2002, respectively. Finally, on January
1, 2005, Phase IV of the ATC culminated in the integration of the remaining 49 percent of
export volumes and all quotas were abolished.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given countries’ ability to choose which quotas to retire in each
phase, quotas removed during the ﬁrst two phases of the ATC were in general not very
painful for producers in developed countries. In the United States, ATC products accounted
for 17.1 billion square meter equivalents (SME) worth of imports in 1990.3 However, U.S.
imports of products actually subject to quotas in that year totalled just 12.2 billion SMEs
(USITC, 2004). As a result, the U.S. found it relatively easy to defer removal of quotas
on “sensitive” products until the third phase. Products such as tents and life jackets, for
example, were included in the ATC but had not been subject to U.S. import quotas. The
United States integrated these products in the ﬁrst phase. As indicated in the ﬁnal column
of Table 1, the United States retired a total of 4,875 ten-digit Harmonized System (HS)
product codes across the four phases, of which 62 percent were retired in 2005. In this paper,
these HS codes are our deﬁnition of the set of T&C products imported by the United States
a n dg o v e r n e db yt h eA T C . 4
In addition to gradually removing quotas, the ATC improved developing countries’ ac-
cess to developed-country markets by accelerating quota growth over the four phases of
quota removal. These changes were governed by what is referred to as the ATC’s “growth-
on-growth” provision and are summarized in the third column of Table 1. At the beginning
of Phase I, existing quota growth rates were accelerated 16 percent per year, while they
2For a more extensive discussions of the road to the ATC, see Spinanger (1999) and Francois and Worz
(2006).
3Product quotas under the MFA and ATC were set in terms of square meter equivalents (SME), with
each product having an explicit “conversion factor” to determine the SME of their native units (e.g., pairs
of socks). Examples of SME are provided in Table 4.
4We are grateful to Keith Daly at OTEXA for providing us with this list.China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 5
were accelerated by 25 and 27 percent in Phases II and III, respectively. A group with
a base quota growth rate of 6 percent in 1994, for example, would grow at 6.96 percent
(0.06*1.16) per year during Phase I, 8.7 percent (0.0696*1.25) per year over Phase II, and
11.05 (0.087*1.27) percent per year during Phase III.5
China’s exclusion from the WTO prior to 2001 rendered it ineligible for ATC integration
beneﬁts during its ﬁrst two phases. After China was admitted formally into the WTO on
December 11, 2001, the United States removed its quotas on China’s Phase I and II imports
simultaneously with the quotas on its Phase III goods on the scheduled Phase III removal
date, i.e., January 1, 2002. After WTO accession, China also received growth rate increases
consistent with the ATC.6
As part of its entry into the WTO, China agreed to special safeguard provisions, subject
to “consultations,” that would limit its exports to countries experiencing market disrup-
tions after the ATC was phased out. Under the guidelines governing China’s accession into
the WTO, WTO members could enter negotiations for new safeguards on Chinese products
provided those countries could show evidence of the existence or threat of a market disrup-
tion and a role for Chinese goods in that disruption (WTO 2001). The safeguard provision
is applicable until December 31, 2008.7
When quotas on the ﬁnal set of products expired on January 1, 2005, domestic textile
and apparel industry groups successfully lobbied for new safeguards against China on 22
MFA groups of products, and they remain eﬀective until the end of 2008. However, the
U.S. and China reached a memorandum of understanding that the U.S. would “exercise
restraint” on additional safeguards. Table 2 lists the quota levels that are operative until
2008.
3. The U.S. MFA/ATC Database
This section describes our construction of the U.S. MFA/ATC database and summarizes
its contents. The database is assembled from U.S. trading partners’ Expired Performance
R e p o r t s ,w h i c hw e r eu s e db yt h eU . S .O ﬃce of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA) to monitor
trading partners’ compliance with the MFA and ATC quotas. Generously provided by
Ron Foote of the U.S. Census Bureau, they document imports, base quotas and quota
adjustments (deﬁned below) by groups of products (referred to as “MFA groups”) and year
for all countries with which the United States negotiated bilateral quota arrangements. The
5Quota growth acceleration was advanced one phase for countries with less than 1.2 percent of the
importing country’s total quotas in 1991.
6China’s growth rates were increased by 27 percent plus an additional pro-rated increase to account for
its 3 weeks of WTO membership in 2001 (USITC, 2004).
7For additional details regarding the post-ATC Chinese safeguards, see Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda
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database covers 1984 to 2004.8
Between 1984 and 2004 the U.S. signed bilateral MFA/ATC agreements with the 71
countries listed in Table 3. Seven of these countries–Barbados, Canada, Lebanon, Paciﬁc
Islands, Portugal, Spain and Trinidad and Tobago–were not subject to what is known
as “speciﬁc limits,” the most restrictive quota classiﬁcation and the focus or our analysis
(see discussion below). The details of an agreement were negotiated over an “agreement
term” which typically lasted several “agreement periods.” For most countries, an agreement
period corresponded to a full calendar year.9 The United States negotiated quotas on 149
three-digit MFA speciﬁc-limit groups; on average, each group contains 17 HS products. The
MFA groups span four T&C “segments:” Yarn, Fabric, Made-Ups and Clothing. Examples
of MFA groups in each segment are provided in Table 4.
Quotas were negotiated on individual MFA groups as well as on both aggregations and
subsets of groups, which are known as “merged” and “part” groups, respectively. As a
result, country-year-group observations in the database actually encompass a mixture of
groups, merged groups and part groups. For simplicity, we refer to all of these observations
as being at the “group” level for the remainder of the paper.
The negotiated quota for any particular group is stated in terms of square meter equiv-
alents (SME) of fabric. To pool potentially diverse groups with diﬀerent native units–e.g.,
pairs of gloves and dozens of shirts–the ATC established “conversion factors” to concord
native units into square meter equivalents. These conversion factors are used to aggregate
base quotas and import levels and to provide a means of shifting quotas across groups with
diﬀerent units (e.g., shirts to socks).
The Expired Performance Reports refer to nine possible classiﬁcations of negotiated
quantities. In this paper, we focus exclusively on “speciﬁc limit” quotas, which, according
to OTEXA, were the most restrictive quotas used under the MFA/ATC. The other clas-
siﬁcations are designated consultation levels, minimum consultation levels, other groups,
restraint limits, guaranteed access levels, designated consultation provisions, agreed limits
and tariﬀ preference levels. Several of these designations are not actually quotas, but rather
served as watch lists. Their application is noted in the MFA/ATC Database.10
Speciﬁc quotas grew at ﬁxed, known rates over an agreement term. Overall, they grew
8Data for 1986 are missing. Reﬁnement of the raw data is discussed in a technical Appendix available
from the authors on request.
9For some countries, including Brazil, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the agreement period in early years
covered overlapping calendar years. All periods were standardized to match the calendar year under the
ATC.
10For some countries, there was another layer of quotas known as “aggregate group limits.”A speciﬁc limit
was a group-speciﬁc quota while the group limit imposed an aggregate quota over several MFA groups. A
group could therefore be bound by a speciﬁc limit (individual, merged or part), subject to an aggregate
speciﬁc limit, or both. One potential explanation for aggregate limits is that it limited the use of ﬂexibilities
across MFA groups (see below). We ignore these aggregate limits in this paper but they are available in the
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an average of 6 percent per year, but growth varied across countries and groups. China,
for example, faced annual speciﬁc quota growth rates of 1 to 2 percent, and wool products
experienced slower growth than cotton goods.11
The U.S. MFA/ATC Database records the “base” quota, the “adjusted base” quota
and the total exports for each speciﬁc limit by country and year. The base quota is the
originally negotiated quota level determined at the start of an agreement term. Adjusted
base quotas reﬂect the use of what are known as “ﬂexibilities,” which allowed countries to
exceed their base quota in a given period by borrowing unused base quota, up to a speciﬁed
percentage of the receiving group, across groups within a year and across years within a
group. Countries could apply multiple ﬂexibilities on a group and the adjustments had to
be met by corresponding oﬀsets in the lending groups.
T h e r ew e r et h r e em a j o rﬂexibilities:
1. Carryforward and carryforward-used: A carryforward allowed countries to borrow
base quota from the subsequent period within a group. A carryforward-used oﬀ-
set a carryforward. For example, in 1997 Macau carried forward 20,419 SME in
group 338 (“Men/boys knit shirts”). The ﬂexibility was then oﬀset in 1998, under
a carryforward-used, by -20,419 SME. Borrowing was subject to a country-product
speciﬁc limit.
2. Carryover and shortfall-used: A carryover utilized unused quota from the previous
period within a group, subject to a country-product speciﬁc maximum. A shortfall-
used oﬀset a carryover.
3. Shift-add, shift-subtract, swing: Shift-add, shift-subtract, and swings allowed across-
group base movements within a year, subject to limits.
After accounting for all ﬂexibilities, the adjusted base quota for a given year reﬂects the
country-group deviation in that year from the original base quota. For example, China’s
2002 base quota for group 219 (“duck fabric”) was 2.6 million SME. China made two
adjustments on this group that year. First, it borrowed 2 percent from the previous year’s
unused quota (carryover). Second, it added 5 percent of its original base quota from another
group (swing). These adjustments resulted in an adjusted base quota of 2.8 million SME
for group 219 in 2002. If a country made no adjustment on a group, the adjusted base
quota simply remained at the base quota.
Table 5 compares countries’ aggregate adjusted base quotas and exports across all groups
from 1984 to 2004. Results are reported for the thirty countries with the largest aggregate
11We include only speciﬁc-limit groups in our examination of ﬁll rates below. In our regression analysis,
non-speciﬁc limit groups are treated as unbound; the regressions include all T&C HS codes from all T&C
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adjusted base quotas. As indicated in the ﬁrst two columns of the table, China, Taiwan and
Hong Kong exhibit the highest levels of both adjusted base quota and exports between 1984
and 2004. The ﬁnal column of Table 5 reports countries’ aggregate “ﬁll rates,” which equal
exports as a percentage of adjusted base quota. Although adjusted base quotas can exceed
base quotas, ﬁll rates cannot exceed 100 because they are deﬁned as exports over adjusted
base. As indicated in the table, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka
all exhibit aggregate ﬁll rates in excess of 80 percent over the sample period. Countries with
relatively low ﬁll rates include Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras.
Fill rates provide a useful indication of quota restrictiveness. We follow the USITC (and
Evans and Harrigan 2005) in deﬁning a binding quota as one in which the ﬁll rate exceeds
90 percent. Here, too, results are reported for the thirty countries with the largest base
quota. As indicated in Table 6, Bangladesh, India and China exhibited the largest share of
binding quotas over the sample period, in each case above 60 percent. We note that using
a more liberal or conservative deﬁnition for binding quotas, that is, ﬁll rates of 80 and 95
percent, respectively, does not result in any substantial re-ranking of counties in terms of
which are most constrained over the sample period.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that less than 30 percent of the quotas were binding for other
major developing East Asian economies such as South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. Thus,
even though these countries were subject to a relatively large fraction of speciﬁc limits (see
Table 7), these limits appear to have been relatively weak. This outcome may be driven
in part by these countries’ relatively fast movement into more sophisticated manufactures
over the sample period. Indeed, we show in the next section that the share of East Asian
observations with binding quotas diminishes over time.
Heterogeneity in ﬁll rates is also apparent across MFA groups. Table 8 reports aggregate
ﬁll rates for the ten largest MFA groups. Trousers and knit shirts are the most constrained
groups, with exporters ﬁlling more than 80 percent of the allocated quota. Textile groups
such as cotton sheeting fabric and cotton poplin exhibited ﬁll rates around 50 percent.
The database reveals that the (weighted) average ﬁll rate across all years and exporters for
textile groups was only 48 percent compared to 72 percent for apparel groups. These ﬁll
rates are consistent with research showing that developed countries apply greater protection
to industries where escaping competition from developing countries is harder. Khandelwal
(2007), for example, argues that it is harder for developed economies to diﬀerentiate their
products in terms of quality in apparel versus textiles.
Table 8 also shows that while there is heterogeneity in aggregate ﬁll rates across products,
China’s ﬁll rates exhibited substantially less variation: in all but one of the ten groups,
China’s ﬁll rates exceeded 90 percent. Columns three and four report Bangladesh’s and
India’s ﬁll rates in the major groups. Although Bangladesh was bound in the apparel groups,
t h eU . S .d i dn o ti m p o s es p e c i ﬁc limits on Bangladesh in the major textile groups, evenChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 9
though Bangladesh exported these products (with the exception of cotton yarns (300/301)).
India’s ﬁll rates varied widely in the ten groups and was not subject to quotas for underwear,
man-made ﬁber knit shirts and man-made ﬁber sweaters.
4. The Relative Restrictiveness of U.S. T&C Quotas
In this section we demonstrate the relative restrictiveness of China’s quotas in terms of
the number of goods subject to quotas, how quickly quotas were allowed to grow and the
extent to which China was allowed to shift quota allocations across products and time.
4.1. Quota Coverage, Fill Rates and ETEs
The share of a country’s MFA groups that are covered by speciﬁc limits provides one
measure of cross-country variation in quota restrictiveness. Table 7 reports these shares
for the major T&C exporters in the pooled 1990 to 2004 dataset.12 As indicated in the
table, China, at 61 percent, exhibits the highest share of exports covered by speciﬁc limits
between 1990 and 2004. Shares for other large Asian exporters are 53 percent for Korea,
51 percent for Taiwan and 46 percent for Hong Kong. By comparison, just 20 percent of
India’s MFA groups were subject to speciﬁc limits.
Fill rates, discussed above, are a second measure of quota restrictiveness. As reported in
Table 5, many countries, particularly those in South Asia, exhibited aggregate ﬁll rates over
the pooled sample period that are similar to those experienced by China. Fill rates, however,
varied substantially over time, as can be seen in Figure 2, which reports the distribution
of ﬁll rates for China and three regions–East/Southeast (E/SE) Asia, South Asia and
the rest-of-world (ROW)–which, together, comprise all other countries in the sample.13
Distributions are reported for three cross-sections, 1985, 1995 and 2004. Each row and
column of the ﬁgure contains histograms for a diﬀerent year and region, respectively. In
each histogram, the last bin reports the share of binding quotas (i.e., those with ﬁll rates
exceeding 90 percent). As indicated in the last three columns of the ﬁgure, countries in
East/Southeast Asia, South Asia and ROW experienced more-or-less steady declines in
binding quotas over the two decades. East/Southeast Asia’s binding quotas, for example,
drop from 60 percent in 1985 to less than 20 percent in 2004, while the fraction for South
Asia decline from 60 and 70 percent in 1985 and 1995, respectively, to 30 percent in 2004.14
12We match the quota data to U.S. import data using a concordance HS-MFA group concordance provided
by OTEXA. We have not yet processed the concordance mapping MFA groups to the Tariﬀ Schedule of the
U.S. (TSUSA) which would allow an analysis of U.S. T&C imports for earlier years.
13The East/Southeast Asian countries are: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos,
Macau, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. The South Asian countries are:
Bangladesh, India, Maldive Islands, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
14The distributions reported in Figure 2 exclude phased-out MFA groups, i.e., the ﬁgure displays the
distributions of ﬁll rates among quotas still applied to the countries.China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 10
China’s distribution of ﬁll rates, on the other hand, remained essentially constant over the
sample period. This evidence suggest that China’s T&C exports to the U.S. remained
relatively constrained throughout the MFA and ATC. China’s fraction of binding quotas,
coupled with the relatively high extensive-margin constraint described above, provide the
ﬁrst two pieces of evidence that China faced a tighter quota regime compared to other
countries.
Andriamananjara et al. (2004) argue that the price wedge created by the quota rents is
a better measure of how tightly a quota binds than its ﬁll rate.15 The origin of these price
wedges and the degree to which they can be observed varies by country. While some coun-
tries, such as Hong Kong, created secondary markets to freely trade license permits, others
allocated licenses based on various criteria. China’s quotas, for example, were managed by
its Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MOFTEC auctioned
oﬀ only a small share of the quotas available under the MFA. The rest were distributed to
ﬁrms according measures of past performace including: their ability to ﬁll at least 90 percent
of their previous quotas; their ability to export other products not subject to constraints;
and their ability to improve the quality of their exports (Yang, 1995).
One way to measure the price wedge created by quota rents is to compute quotas’
export tax equivalents (ETEs). Under a perfectly competitive T&C market, the export tax





where lcmt is the license price paid by the ﬁrm in country c in order to export products in
MFA group m at time t ( m e a s u r e di nd o l l a r sp e rS M E )a n duvcmt i st h ef r e eo nb o a r du n i t
value.
We ﬁnd that ﬁll rates and estimated ETE’s are roughly consistent in indicating the
extent to which China’s exports face a binding quota. Using data on Chinese export license
prices available for a subset of MFA groups from 1999 to 2004, we compute the export tax
equivalents of U.S. import quotas on Chinese products for these groups.16 As indicated
in Table 9, which summarizes the results of regressing the log of ETE on MFA group
ﬁl lr a t e sa sw e l la sy e a rﬁxed eﬀects, ﬁll rates and ETEs are positively correlated. The
estimated coeﬃc i e n ti s2 . 1a n dh i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant; it implies that a 10 percentage point
increase in the ﬁll rate is associated with a 21 percent rise in the ETE. Column two reports
an analogous regression but includes MFA group ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore relies solely on
variation within groups to identify the correlation coeﬃcient. As indicated in the table,
15In countries where export licenses are used to ensure quota adherence, for example, quotas could be bind-
ing even if ﬁll rates are low due to insuﬃcient or mis-allocation of licenses. According to Andriamananjara
et al. (2004), the internal license allocation regime was ineﬃcient and expensive in many countries.
16Data on Chinese export license prices is available at www.chinaquota.com. Unfortunately, similar data
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the estimated coeﬃcient is 1.4. These relationships are intuitive: one would expect that
ﬁrms pay higher license prices for products in which capacity to export is tighter. While
license price data is only available for China in select years and MFA groups, we interpret
these results as providing support for our and others’ use of ﬁll rates as a gauge of quota
restrictiveness.
Our results regarding the relative restrictiveness of U.S. import quotas on China com-
pared to its other trading partners are consistent with the more detailed inquiry of Francois
and Worz (2006), who estimate ETEs in a gravity-based econometric model that does not
require observation of license prices. They ﬁnd that China’s ETEs increased non-linearly
under the ATC and estimate China’s ETEs in 2002 at 8 percent and 67 percent for Chinese
textiles and apparel, respectively. By comparison, they estimate India’s ETEs at only 2
percent for textiles and 5 percent for apparel.
4.2. Quota Growth Rates
The evolution of countries’ ﬁll rates over time implies that quota growth exceeded export
growth for all regions except China. Figure 3 traces out the median year-over-year growth in
base quota for the four regions over the sample period. For East/Southeast Asia, South Asia
and ROW, the step increases in base quota growth rates match the ATC growth-on-growth
provision described in Table 1 above. Annual growth for ROW, for example, increased by
16 percent (from 6.00 to 6.96 percent) at the beginning of Phase 1, by 25 percent (to 8.7
percent) at the beginning of Phase II, and by an additional 27 percent (to 11.05 percent)
at the beginning of Phase III. The step functions for East and South Asia exhibit identical
increases.
China’s trajectory of base quota growth, in contrast, is essentially ﬂat. Prior to the
ATC, China’s growth was roughly equal to that for East/Southeast Asian countries, but
in 1994, China’s base quota growth was frozen (set to zero). China became eligible for the
growth-on-growth provision in 2002, after entry into the WTO, and its median growth rate
ticked up slightly, but the magnitude of the increase was small given China’s low growth
rate. China’s overall base growth rate was much lower than the rest of the world for the
remainder of the ATC. This restrictiveness also varied across MFA groups. For example,
the U.S. imposed slower quota growth for wool products (1 percent for all region in 1995),
but even lower growth in these products for China (0.5 percent) overall growth.
4.3. Flexibilities
The restrictiveness of the U.S. quota regime can also be measured in terms of countries’
ability to adjust their base quotas over time. As discussed above, the MFA/ATC agreements
granted trading partners limited ﬂexibility to borrow and lend quotas across groups and
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has received little attention in the literature. In this section, we examine both the use of
ﬂexibilities as well as their intensity, conditional on use. We ﬁnd that China’s adjustments
to its base quotas were more frequent and smaller than those of other countries.
Table 10 demonstrates that China made relatively greater use of ﬂexibilities in terms of
frequency than many countries between 1984 and 2004. During this period, China made an
adjustment to 92 percent of its quotas. Indeed, a striking feature of the data is that China
made at least one adjustment to every quota group between 2000 and 2004.
One potential explanation for China’s relatively frequent adjustments is that it faced
more restrictive caps on its ability to reallocate quotas across groups and time. If ﬂexibility
caps were small, a desired increase in one group might involve more transfers across groups
or years than if the caps were large. Unfortunately, the Expired Performance Reports do
not provide comprehensive information on countries’ ﬂexibility limits over the entire sample
period.17 Details available for 1997, however, indicate that China was allowed across-group
shifts up to a maximum of 5 percent of the receiving group’s base quota and across-time
movements of up to 3 percent. Bangladesh and Jamaica, by contrast, were permitted shifts
of up to 7 percent across groups and 11 percent across time.
While some countries, notably India and Bangladesh, also made frequent use of the
ﬂexibility provisions, among these countries, China faced relatively tighter “ﬂexibility mar-
gins” across groups. We deﬁne these margins to be the absolute percentage deviation of
the adjusted base from the original base for a particular country, group and year. They
are computed across all groups in which adjustments are observed. China’s median margin,
at 5 percent, is the lowest among countries that made adjustments on at least 80 percent
of its quota groups. China’s margin was also about half the level exhibited by India and
Bangladesh.
Another potential explanation for China’s greater use of ﬂexibilities was the relative re-
strictiveness of its quotas. Given the relatively high number of products bound by quotas,
their relatively high ﬁll rates, and their relatively low annual growth rates, frequent adjust-
ments to its base levels may have been necessary to respond to given demand or supply
shocks.18 Countries relatively less constrained by their quota levels and growth rates, by
contrast, would have more room to respond without making as many adjustments. More-
over, China’s was limited in its ability to shift quotas to respond to these shocks. Though
we do not pursue this topic here, it is likely that data on countries’ ﬂexibility limits and us-
age under the MFA/ATC could be used to help construct and calibrate a model of optimal
quota borrowing and lending.
17Flexibilities were capped at an amount determined by the country’s bilateral agreement. Unfortunately,
we do not have these details for all agreements in the database.
18Indeed, Francois and Worz (2006) ﬁnd that China’s ETEs spiked to 25 and 112 percent for textiles and
apparel, respectively, in 2004, when China no longer had the ability to carry forward additional quota levels
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5. Quantity Responses to ATC Phase-Outs
In this section, we examine China and other countries’ export quantity responses to the
ATC phaseouts. We show that countries’ export growth occurred primarily in incumbent
products, that it varied according to the relative restrictiveness of China’s quotas, and that
China’s export surge in 2005 had ample precedent in prior phases of quota liberalization.
5.1. Overview
Figure 4 provides an overview of U.S. T&C consumption from 1990 to 2006 according
to whether goods were sourced from domestic manufacturers, China, or other U.S. trading
partners (ROW).19 As indicated in the ﬁgure, the contribution of domestic producers and
other trading partners rose more-or-less steadily through the 1990s. China’s exports, on
the other hand, remained relatively ﬂat for the reasons outlined above until 2001. After
2001, China’s exports surge, other trading partners’ exports begin to level oﬀ and U.S.
production starts a long-run decline. Between 2000 and 2006, China’s total T&C exports
increased almost six-fold from 4.3 billion to 25 billion SME.
To gain a better sense of the potential impact of China’s reaction to quota relaxation
on other regions’ exports, Figure 5 plots the evolution of export quantities by region be-
tween 2000 and 2006. Several regions’ exports–e.g., North America, the Caribbean and
Oceania–end this period lower than they started, with losses for some (e.g., Oceania) being
deeper than others. Other regions experienced reversals of robust export growth during the
period. Central America’s long-running increase in T&C exports between 2000 and 2005,
for example, declined precipitously in 2006. The importance of this reversal is underscored
by the fact that T&C goods accounted for roughly three quarters of Central America’s total
manufacturing exports to the U.S. in 2004. Similar reversals were experienced by South
America, the former Soviet Union, East Asia, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. For
each of these regions, T&C exports in 2006 were lower than their maximum between 2000
and 2005. South and Southeast Asia, and, although a bit more erratic, the E.U. and North
Africa, were the only regions to experience steady export growth between 2000 and 2006.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a more formal assessment of China’s impact
on other U.S. trading partners T&C exports to the United States.
5.2. Intensive vs Extensive Margin Export Growth as Quotas are Removed
Export growth in response to quota relaxation has two potential sources. The ﬁrst
is net growth within countries’ continuing products, i.e., along their “intensive” margin.
19U.S. production ﬁgures are taken from a report of U.S. T&C production published quarterly by OTEXA
(OTEXA, 2007). This publication states that exports at the MFA group level are unreliable, so we set exports
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The second is net growth due to adding new products or dropping previously exported
products, i.e., along their “extensive” margin.20 Ap r i o r i , it is not obvious which margin
will dominate; depending upon assumptions, shifting resources into additional product lines
m a yb em o r ep r o ﬁtable than increasing the capacity of existing product lines.
Table 11 decomposes countries’ aggregate export quantity growth in percentage terms
in the year following each phase of ATC integration. We document export patterns by ATC
integration to emphasize the similarities in exporting behavior across each integration stage.
Except for China, responses are reported by region. The ﬁrst column for each phase notes
regions’ aggregate growth, while the subsequent two columns decompose this aggregate
growth into the parts due to countries’ intensive and extensive margins. Each panel reports
the change in quantities in the year of integration for each phase. That is, panel one reports
growth in 1995, panel two in 1998, and so on. Since China became eligible for Phase I and II
integration in 2002, the bottom row reports China’s response in this year for those phases.
As indicated in Table, export growth coinciding with Chinese quota relaxation primarily
occurs through the intensive margin. For China, the intensive margin represents more than
9 0p e r c e n to fg r o w t hi nP h a s e sI ,I I Ia n dI V ,a n dt w o - t h i r d so fg r o w t hi nP h a s eI I .A c r o s sa l l
other U.S. trading partners, the intensive margin represented the more important margin
of adjustment in Phases II-IV.
Table 11 also provides an initial view of the contemporaneous response of China’s export
growth following each integration phase. China’s overall response in the year of each phase-
out was 42, 32, 306 and 271 percent for Phases I to IV, respectively. We note that China’s
Phase III increase accounted for 71 percent of the total increase in Phase III exports in 2002
(i.e., 22 of 31 percentage points). In 2005, aggregate exports from all countries excluding
China actually fell 2 percent, a signal that China’s impact on other U.S. trading partners
was potentially large in this ﬁnal phase.
5.3. Reactions to Relaxation of China’s Quotas
Other U.S. trading partners’ reaction to the relaxation of China’ quotas varied according
to their relative restrictiveness. As noted above, we classify China’s quotas in the year prior
to each phase as being binding if they exhibit a ﬁll rate in excess of 90 percent.21 To estimate
the diﬀerential growth associated with relaxation of bound and unbound quotas, we regress
the change in country-products’ export quantity on region-year dummies interacted with a
dummy variable indicating whether China’s quota was previously binding,22
∆lnqcrht = β1rtChinaBoundh,t−1 + β2rtChinaUnboundh,t−1 + νcrht (2)
20As noted earlier, the United States imposed quotas at the level of three-digit MFA groups. These groups
contain a median of 19 HS products.
21Results do not change when we perturb this cutoﬀ.
22Because ﬁll rates are available at the MFA group level, we attribute group-level ﬁll rates to all HS
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where ∆lnqcrht is the change in export quantity of country c in region r in HS product h
between years t and t+1 and β1rt and β2rt are region-year dummies. These region-year dum-
mies are interacted with ChinaBoundh,t−1,a dummy variable which equals unity if China’s
quota in product h in year t−1 had a ﬁll rate exceeding 90 percent, and ChinaUnboundh,t−1,
is a dummy variable which equals one if China was not subject to a binding quota. Vis a
vis the aggregate growth pattern displayed in Table 11, this regression diﬀerences out the
country-product ﬁxed eﬀects. β1rt and β2rt therefore identify the average quantity change
across countries in region r within country-products in which China faced binding and non-
binding quotas, respectively.23 We focus here on other countries’ responses in goods in
which China faced non-binding and binding quotas to gain insight into how these regions
were inﬂuenced by China. Toward that end, the coeﬃcients we report for Phases I to III
are for 2002; for Phase IV, we report coeﬃcients for 2005. In line with the results of Table
11, equation 2 concentrates on countries’ reactions along the intensive margin.
Table 12 reports OLS estimates for four separate estimations of equation (2), one for
each phase of ATC integration. There are two columns for each phase: the ﬁrst reports
countries’ average growth in products where China previously faced non-binding quotas
(β2rt), while the second column reports countries’ average growth in products where China
previously faced binding quotas (β1rt).
Results for Phase I in the ﬁrst panel of Table 12 contain all zeros in the binding column
because none of China’s quotas on Phase I products were binding in 2001.24 The second
panel reports the 2002 region-year ﬁxed eﬀects for Phase II products. Results in this column
indicate that China averaged 153 percent (e0.93−1) export growth in non-binding products
and an incredible 855 percent (e2.26−1) average increase in bound products. Note that the
growth rates for Phase II are higher than the aggregate growth rate reported at the bottom
of Table 11; this discrepancy is likely due to the fact that small products grew faster than
the large products.25 Results for East Asia and South Asia suggest that exports from these
regions increased in products where China’s quotas were not binding but declined in the
products where China faced binding quotas. Results for Phase III show a similar result with
respect to China’s response, but more muted responses by other countries. China’s exports
in products subject to binding quotas increased 511 percent compared to 291 percent in
unbound products.
23We exclude the constant in this regression, and standard errors are clustered by exporting country.
24Phase I products were placed in the 9xx MFA groups which were a collection of products with which
the U.S. was relatively unconcerned and therefore integrated early. The U.S. MFA/ATC Database does
not have quota information for these MFA groups. We interpret the fact that this information is missing
as evidence that goods in these groups were unconstrained by quotas and this fact was conﬁrmed through
correspondences with OTEXA.
25See Arkolakis (2007) for a model of market penetration implying that low-volume products grow faster
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The point estimates for Phase IV are perhaps the most dramatic. Here, too, China’s
export quantity growth is signiﬁcantly higher in its bound versus unbound products, 463
percent versus 261 percent. Response to Chinese growth are equally dramatic, with nine of
fourteen regions experiencing negative and signiﬁcant declines in China’s bound products.
These response contrast starkly with those associated with Phase III.
Variation in countries’ reactions to the removal of Chinese quotas likely reﬂects dif-
ferences in comparative advantage across T&C products. Though formal assessment of
countries’ elasticities of substitution with Chinese exports requires structural estimation
beyond the scope of this chapter, the results in Table 12 can be used to provide a rough
guide as to which countries were the biggest “losers” with respect to China. Toward that
end, Table 13 reports the results of a Phase IV regression like that in equation 2 but at the
country level. Countries are ordered according to their average response in China’s previ-
ously bound products, with statistically signiﬁcant responses in bold. Of the 143 countries in
the table, average exports fell in 102 countries, and these drops were statistically signiﬁcant
for 54 countries. Statistically signiﬁcant declines range from a low of 13 percent (e0.14 − 1)
for Italy to a high of more than 80 percent for Kuwait, Russia, the Maldives, Micronesia,
Guinea and Oman. Remarkably, only eight countries exhibit an increase in exports. Three
of the largest South Asian exporters — Bangladesh, India and Pakistan — report positive
but statistically insigniﬁcant changes in exports. Though these countries fare much better
than others, it is possible their export growth might have been much higher in the absence
of robust Chinese growth.
Declines among Sub-Saharan African exporters may have been particularly economically
signiﬁcant. These countries experienced increasing T&C exports to the United States from
2000 to 2004 because of modiﬁcations made to the rules-of-origin requirements under AGOA;
as shown in Figure 5, the region’s T&C exports doubled between 2000 and 2004. These
modiﬁcations–collectively referred to as the “Special Rule”—allowed countries to satisfy
rules-of-origin requirements using fabric of any origin provided that the clothing assembly
took place within the countries’ borders. As discussed in Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda
(2007), ﬁrms responded to the Special Rule by importing fabrics from Asian countries for
assembly in Africa.26 The Special Rule also lead to substantial inward foreign direct invest-
ment as multinational ﬁrms located the ﬁnal stages of production in Africa to “hop” over
quotas (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2007). These responses contributed to a boom in Sub-
Saharan T&C production, particularly in Madagascar, Lesotho and Swaziland. Between
2000 and 2004, for example, Lesotho’s T&C exports to the United States nearly quadru-
pled, to $455 million, as the number of T&C factories located in the country doubled from
21 to 47 (IMF 2007). In the year following the end of the ATC in 2005, however, Lesotho’s
26The following AGOA countries were not eligible for the Special Rule provision: Botswana, Gabon,
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T&C production shrank considerably.27 Both the value and quantity of its T&C exports to
the United States fell 14 percent; in China’s bound products, the average Lesotho export
fell 43 percent. These declines were accompanied by a 30 percent fall in employment, to
35,000 workers, and one quarter of its production facilities being shuttered (IMF 2007).
The most plausible explanation for the sharp decline in Sub-Saharan T&C production
following the end of the ATC (and, therefore, the end of the Special Rule’s value) is that
African production costs are prohibitive, either because relatively low wages are in fact
relatively high in quality- or productivity-adjusted terms or because transport costs make
multi-national production absent an extra inducement infeasible. Further research into the
reasons behind this decline would be useful both for evaluating appropriate policy responses
and for understanding the dynamics of Sub-Saharan African economies.
6. Price Responses to ATC Phaseouts
A second margin along which countries might react to the removal of import quotas is
price. In this section we examine the evolution of the United States’ T&C import free-on-
board unit values (i.e., import value per SME) subsequent to each Phase of ATC integration.
In contrast to the results reported above, we here focus on countries’ unit value changes in
response to their own, not China’s, quota relaxations.
Table 14 reports the results of a regression similar to equation (2) but where the depen-
dent variable is the log diﬀerence in unit value rather than export quantity, and where the
binding dummy takes a value of one if the country-product was constrained in its country of
origin the prior year. As a result, coeﬃcient estimates are with respect to 1995, 1998, 2002
and 2005 for Phases I through IV, respectively in the upper portion of the table. China’s
response to its Phase I and II good quota relaxations in the year in which those quotas were
actually removed (i.e., 2002) are reported at the bottom of the table.
As indicated in Table 14, China’s average unit values fell in the years that its products
were integrated. Here, as above, responses varied according to whether or not China faced
binding quotas. Unit value declines for exports previously restrained by China’s binding
quotas were larger in all integration phases. In 2002, Chinese unit values for bound Phase
II products fell 55 percent (e−0.81 − 1) versus 32 percent for unbound products. For Phase
III and IV products, the declines for China were 48 versus 42 percent, and 41 versus 31
percent, respectively. More broadly, though unit value responses vary across phases, they
are generally negative and signiﬁcant for East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, and
generally larger in bound products than unbound products.
One explanation for China’s and other countries’ unit value declines is simply that as
quotas are relaxed, goods prices decline and ﬁrms slide down their demand curves as prices
27As noted by Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007), Sub-Saharan T&C exports in 2005 were also hurt
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and quantities adjust to the previously unrealizable competitive outcome. Indeed, Francois
and Worz (2006) estimate the export tax equivalent of Chinese quotas to be 25 percent for
textiles and 110 percent for apparel in 2004. With the quotas removed, ETEs, by deﬁnition,
fall to zero.
Declining prices might also accompany quota relaxation as a result of quality downgrad-
ing. It is well known in the international trade literature that ﬁr m sf a c i n gq u o t a sh a v ea n
incentive to export higher-margin goods; see, for example, the theoretical research of Kr-
ishna (1987) and Das and Donnenfeld (1987) and the empirical studies of Aw and Roberts
(1986) and Feenstra (1988). Evans and Harrigan (2005), for example, ﬁnd that U.S. imports
of products facing binding quotas exhibit a 6.3 percent price premium relative to unbound
imports. Under the assumption that prices reﬂect only vertical product diﬀerentiation, the
results reported in Table 14 provide prima facie evidence that China’s T&C quality fell
following the removal of quotas.
Quality upgrading in response to quantitative restrictions is possible through changes in
demand or changes in supply-side characteristics. In the former, imposition of quota rents
leads to identical markups across products which induce consumers to substitute towards
higher-priced varieties. This eﬀect is similar to Alchian and Allen’s (1964) Washington
apples story where higher-priced goods are shipped over greater distances to lower the per
dollar transport costs (see also Hummels and Skiba 2004). Feenstra and Boorstein (1994)
infer quality in this context by comparing a unit value index, which uses quantity weights,
to an exact price index, which uses value weights: if the unit value index increases by more
than the exact price index, consumption has shifted towards more expensive goods and
average quality of goods from the restricted country increases. Using this method to study
the aﬀects of quota removal, Harrigan and Barrows (2007) ﬁnd that the quality of China’s
bound products fell 7 percent more than its unbound products when quotas were removed
in 2005.
Here, we complement Harrigan and Barrows (2007) by using an approach developed in
Khandelwal (2007) to measure quality changes within countries’ products. As discussed in
detail in the Appendix, this approach uses a discrete choice demand system to infer country-
product (i.e., variety) quality, relative to the average U.S. domestic quality, by estimating
diﬀerences in relative market shares after controlling for prices. We then examine how these
measures of country-product quality react to quota removal using a speciﬁcation analogous
to the ones employed above,
∆θcht = β1rtChinaBoundh,t−1 + β2rtChinaUnboundh,t−1 + νcrht.( 3 )
where θcht is the estimated quality of country c in product h at time t obtained from a
implementing the approach discussed in the Appendix. In this speciﬁcation, we regress
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ChinaBoundh,t−1, a dummy variable which equals unity if China’s quota in product h in
year t−1 had a ﬁll rate exceeding 90 percent, and ChinaUnboundh,t−1, is a dummy variable
which equals one if China was not subject to a binding quota. To focus attention on China,
we estimate a single ROW ﬁxed eﬀect for each year for all other countries and, as before,
run the regressions separately by phase. For Phases I and II, we report coeﬃcients for 2002
when China became eligible for integration, rather than the phaseout deﬁned under the
ATC. Coeﬃcients and standard errors are reported in Table 15.
The coeﬃcients generally report a positive change in quality in the year of integration for
both bound and unbound varieties and for both China and the ROW. On ﬁrst inspection,
these results appear inconsistent with the idea that dismantling quotas results in quality
downgrading. Recall, however, that our measure of country-product quality reﬂects con-
sumers’ valuation of Chinese goods relative to “outside goods,” which, in this case, are
domestic varieties. These relative valuations complicate the evaluation of the results in
Table 15 because, for example, a deterioration in the quality of the outside good would lead
to increase in the quality of the imported varieties. That is, our measure of quality does
not separately identify shifts in preferences across HS products versus shifts in preferences
towards the outside good.28
We can use the coeﬃcients in reported in Table 15 to compute a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate of China quality upgrading in bound products that uses quality change in unbound
products and the ROW as baselines.29 First, we ﬁr s tt a k et h ed i ﬀerence between China’s
change in quality for bound and unbounded varieties; for Phase IV this is 0.72-1.01, or
-0.29. This ﬁrst diﬀerence controls for country-speciﬁc changes in technology or shifts in
demand that are common to all varieties within the country. Second, we compare this
diﬀerence to the analogous diﬀerence in the ROW’s coeﬃcients for China’s bound and
unbound products; for Phase IV this is -0.29-0.18, or -0.47. This second diﬀerence nets out
changes in consumers’ valuation across varieties. For example, suppose there is a positive
technology shock to the Chinese T&C industry. The ﬁrst diﬀerence would control for
the technology shock since the shock would be common to China’s bound and unbound
exports. Now suppose an extreme winter increases the demand winter clothing; this shock,
common to both China and ROW assuming away compositional diﬀerences, is controlled
by diﬀerencing Chinese quality with the ROW within products. In this way, the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimate provides an uncontaminated estimate of the relative Chinese bound-
versus-unbound quality change following each phase-out.
28See Nevo (2003) for a detailed discussion on this point. We note that the quality levels could be biased
upwards if measurement error in the prices leads to attenuation bias in α. Assuming that the attenuation
bias is the same in bound and unbound products, this possibility provides further motivation for computing
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates. Problems associated with measurement error are also mitigated by our
use of trade costs as an instrument for price.
29Actually, this is a triple diﬀerence speciﬁc a t i o n ,b u ts i n c ew ef o c u so nchanges in quality, the time
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Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates for each Phase are reported in the bottom panel of
Table 15. As mentioned earlier, China’s Phase I products were not subject to binding
quotas, so we merely report the diﬀerence between China’s and the ROW’s unbound quality
changes, which is positive and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. For Phase II, we ﬁnd
that China’s bound products actually increase in quality, an outcome that is inconsistent
with theory. One possible explanation for this result is that Phase II products were only
marginally binding in a way that our assessment of bindingness does not pick up.
We do ﬁnd relative declines in China’s bound products’ quality in response to Phases III
and IV, though only the latter estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. In
both Phases, China registered improvements in quality within bound and unbound varieties,
but ROW quality increases by more. These results appear consistent with theory and
complement the across-good shifts in demand identiﬁed by Harrigan and Barrows (2006)
for Phase IV products. They also support the idea that restrictions on China were relatively
more stringent.
7. China’s T&C Future
China’s share of U.S. textile and clothing imports jumped three-fold, from 10 to 33
percent, between the time it joined the WTO in December 2001 and the end of the ATC
regime in 2005. This growth, and in particular China’s surging exports in the early months
of 2005, spurred domestic ﬁrms and other developing countries to lobby the United States,
successfully, for the re-imposition of textile and clothing quotas on China. By the middle of
2005, the U.S. and China had agreed to new limits on China’s exports in a subset of T&C
categories previously covered by Phase IV of the ATC. These categories are listed in Table
2; they are to remain in eﬀect until 2008.
Some analysts believe that China’s large increase in Phase IV exports in early 2005 oc-
curred primarily as a hedge against future protectionist measures. By dramatically increas-
ing their exports early in the year, this line of thinking goes, Chinese ﬁrms would be able
to establish higher base levels for an inevitable new round of quotas. Table 2 provides some
evidence in favor of this hypothesis, as the new, post-ATC quota levels agreed to in 2005
were substantially larger than the levels previously imposed by the ATC. Going forward, it
is not clear that China will be free of quotas after 2008. According to its WTO accession
documents, WTO member countries are allowed to impose product-speciﬁcs a f e g u a r d so n
China to prevent market disruptions until 2013. As a result, the U.S. might continue to
apply quotas or resort to other forms of protection, such as anti-dumping remedies, once
the current safeguards are removed (Bown, 2007). Whalley and Dayaratna-Banda (2007)
argue that the new safeguards are merely a means of re-imposing an MFA/ATC regime on
China, with the major exception that quotas now just apply to China as opposed to all
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China’s exports to the EU also surged after ATC expired. This increase induced a
similar response in the EU, with the result that China and the EU also signed a new bilateral
agreement in 2005 restricting China’s imports in 10 groups of T&C products through 2007.30
As was well reported at the time, China satisﬁed its quotas in these goods by September
2005, with the result that $501 million worth of Chinese goods backed up on European
ports.31 Only after high-level negotiations led to an amended quota agreement for 2005 were
these goods allowed into the EU. The EU’s new safeguards remain in eﬀectuntil December
31, 2007; they are summarized in Table 16.
Many observers have reacted to China’s T&C export growth with the claim that all of the
world’s T&C production will relocate to China once its quotas are abolished permanently.
Interestingly, Chinese oﬃcials appear to be looking beyond their dominance of apparel and
textiles, and have voiced concern that rising wages will erode their comparative advantage
in this sector vis a vis even lower-wage countries like Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh.32
Though such an outcome appears unlikely, at least in the near term, these countries have
become more important sources of T&C exports in recent years. In the year after its trade
relations with the U.S. were normalized in 2001, for example, Vietnam’s T&C exports
to the U.S. increased 240 percent, though its market share in terms of quantity in 2005
remained under 2 percent. Until 2007, when it, too joined the WTO, Vietnam’s exports
were hampered by U.S. quotas on 25 groups of T&C products.
Given the large T&C export capacity of China, China’s dominance of the T&C market
should continue into the near future, especially as the new safeguards expire. As China
continues its transition towards more capital- and and skill-intensive industries, however, it
is likely that the relative importnace of apparel and textiles in the Chinese economy will fall.
Already, T&C exports have declined to 11 percent of the country’s total exports to the U.S.,
down from 26 percent in 1990. As this transition continues, it is likely that countries at
earlier stages of development, such as Cambodia and Vietman, will become bigger players.
8. Appendix: Quality Estimation
This Appendix explains how to identify quality from the T&C import data. The frame-
work is based on the approach taken by Khandelwal (2007) and the reader is referred to
that paper for additional details.
We assume that consumers have discrete choice preferences and select the one country-
product variety that provides them with the highest utility. The (indirect) utility that
30Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley (2007) report that China has either signed, or is in negotiations to sign,
similar quota agreements with Brazil, Turkey, Canada, Mexico and Peru.
31“Europe and China in Accord Over End to a Textile Dispute,”New York Times, September 6, 2005.
32See the discussions of the 2007 China Development Forum, “Towards New Models of Economic Growth”,
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consumer obtains from purchasing variety ch is
Vchnt = θ1ch + θ2t + ξcht − αpcht + εchnt, (4)
where θch + θt + ξcht denotes the quality of variety ch at time t, pcht denotes its price and
εchnt is a random consumer-variety speciﬁc term. The random term ε introduces horizontal
diﬀerentiation; its inclusion precludes prices from being suﬃcient statistics for quality.33
The random term ε can be decomposed into two randomly distributed components,
εchnt = ψhnt +( 1− σ)νchnt, (5)
with 0 ≤ σ<1.T h e ψ term is a consumer-HS product random eﬀect which provides
consumer n with an idiosyncratic utility from choosing a variety that resides in product h.
This term generates a nested logit system which is a more ﬂexibility demand model because
it alleviates the IIA problem found in simple logit models. The product-level random eﬀect
creates correlation across varieties within a same HS code which means that consumers are
more likely to substitute towards varieties within the same product.34
Under the assumption that ν is an i.i.d extreme value, we can aggregate over all individ-
ual purchases in the economy to obtain aggregate market shares for each variety (e.g., see
Berry 1994). In order to complete the demand system, the consumer is allowed to choose
an “outside” good if none of the inside varieties provides him with a high enough utility. In
this context, the outside good market share is the U.S. market share.
The aggregation leads to the following demand system equation
lnscht − lns0t = θ1ch + θ2t − αpcht + σlnsc|ht + ξcht (6)
The left hand side of the demand system measures the variety’s market share scht relative
to the outside good market share (s0t). We run regression (6) separately for aggregates of
the MFA groups.35 This allows price sensitivities and year ﬁxed eﬀects to vary by aggregate
l e a d i n gt om o r eﬂexible parameter estimates. The portion of observed quality are captured
by country-product (θ1ch)a n dy e a r( θ2t) ﬁxed eﬀects. The price is denoted by pcht where
α captures price sensitivity (a semi-elasticity). The sc|ht term results from the demand
structure that nests varieties within products. This term captures the variety’s market
33In a vertical market, prices are suﬃcient statistics for quality. Here, a variety that happens to possess
a low quality, θch,a n dah i g hp r i c e ,pcht, may still be purchased if the consumer draws a high εchnt.
34As σ goes to zero, the within product correlation also goes to zero and the model converges to a standard
logit model.
35Market share within an MFA group sum to one, but we pool observations over aggregates of the MFA
groups. For example, one aggregate includes dresses which diﬀer according to fabric (e.g., MFA groups 336,
436, 636, 736, and 836). MFA groups are classiﬁed into 43 aggregates.China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 23
share within product h at time t. Finally, ξcht is the unobserved component of quality that
becomes the residual of the estimating equation. Since this term is potentially correlated
with prices, we have the classic simultaneity problem associated with estimating demand
curves. We identify the equation by instrumenting price with trade costs.36 The estimated
qualities are deﬁned by θcht = θ1ch+θ2t+ξcht. The interpretation of these quality measures
is that conditional on price, the variety with higher market shares have higher quality.37
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Phase Starting  Date
Share of Export 
Volume Integrated
Increase in Quota 
Growth Rate
Number of HS 
Products Integrated
I January 1, 1995 16 16 318
II January 1, 1998 17 25 744
III January 1, 2002 18 27 745
IV January 1, 2005 49 n/a 2,978
Notes: Table describes the four phases of the Agreement on Textiles and Quotas. First three columns describe 
aspects of the Agreement that were common to all signatories. Final column reports the integration of products as 
implemented by the United States. Quota growth acceleration was advanced one phase for countries with less 
than 1.2 percent of the importing country's total quotas in 1991. Source: OTEXA.
Table 1: ATC Integration ScheduleChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 27
MFA Category Unit 2004 Quota 2005 Exports 2006 Quota 2007 Quota 2008 Quota
200 Yarns and sewing thread
a
KG 939,116 na na na na
300/301 Carded and combed cotton yarn
a KG 2,671,428 na na na na
200/301
a
KG - 6,949,753 7,529,582 8,832,199 10,131,052
222 Knit fabric KG 10,619,328 18,145,812 15,966,487 18,728,689 21,482,908
229 Special purporse fabric
b KG - 29,001,226 33,162,019 39,237,301 45,007,492
332/432/632 Hosiery
c
DPR 42,433,990 58,230,777 na na na
332/432/632-B Baby socks
c
DPR - - 61,146,461 71,724,800 80,866,195
332/432/632-T Baby socks
c DPR - - 64,386,841 75,443,136 85,058,437
338/339 Cotton knitted shirts & blouses DOZ 2,523,532 20,624,490 20,822,111 23,893,373 26,938,606
340/640 Men's and boys' woven shirts DOZ 2,345,946 6,173,242 6,743,644 7,738,332 8,724,590
345/645/646 Sweaters DOZ 1,030,348 7,850,557 8,179,211 9,477,660 10,581,854
347/348 Cotton trousers DOZ 2,421,922 18,379,851 19,666,049 22,566,791 25,442,951
349/649 Brassieres DOZ 17,729,479 20,717,107 22,785,906 26,146,827 29,479,266
352/652 Underwear DOZ 5,276,745 18,175,964 18,948,937 21,957,081 24,302,011
359-S/659-S Swimwear KG 750,959 5,951,219 4,590,626 5,267,743 5,990,767
363 Cotton terry towels NO 24,773,109 87,842,008 103,300,000 118,600,000 134,828,519
443 Men's & boys' wool suits NO 140,015 1,613,356 1,346,082 1,544,629 1,756,637
447 Men's & boys' wool trousers DOZ 76,352 203,332 215,004 246,718 280,581
619 Polyester filament fabric
b
M2 - 60,348,016 55,308,506 63,466,510 72,177,600
620 Other synthetic filament fabric
b
M2 - 83,531,558 80,197,248 92,026,342 103,755,190
622 Glass fabric
b M2 - 30,274,778 32,265,013 37,846,860 43,412,575
638/639 MMF knitted shirts & blouses DOZ 2,712,680 3,762,225 8,060,063 9,248,922 10,427,707
647/648 MMF trousers DOZ 2,974,238 6,490,061 7,960,355 9,134,507 10,298,709
666 Window blinds/window shades KG 573,372 0 964,014 1,106,206 1,268,884
847 Silk blend & other vegetable fibre trousers
b
DOZ - 15,714,461 17,647,255 20,250,225 23,029,668
Notes:  Table reports the safeguards imposed on Chinese products in 2005. 
aIn 2004, quotas were placed on MFA 200 and the group MFA 
300/301. In 2006, quotas were reimposed on MFA 200 and MFA 301 to reflect a new group category, MFA 200/301. Using the footnotes in 
the OTEXA expired performance reports, we aggregated 2005 exports to reflect this new group and denote 2005-08 exports and quotas 
within 200 and 300/301 with a "na". 
bNo specific limit quotas in 2004. 
cIn 2004, quotas were applied on MFA group 332/432/632, and in 2006, 
quotas were imposed on two new group categories, 332/432/632-B and 332/432/632-T.  We were unable determine if the quota levels for 
these two new MFA groups reflect an aggregate quota or not, so we report the 2006-08 figures for 332/432/632-B and 332/432/632-T as 
reported in the official OTEXA documents, and denote 2006-08 quotas for 332/432/632 with a "na". For 2005 exports, we aggregate the 
exports from MFA 332, 432, and 632 using the trade data and the HS-MFA concordance described in the text. Source: Authors' calculations 
from the trade data and OTEXA. Source: OTEXA and authors' calculations.
Table 2: Chinese Quotas under Safeguards, 2006-2008China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 28
Argentina Dominican Republic Kenya Oman Sri Lanka
Bahrain Egypt Korea, South *Pacific Islands Taiwan
Bangladesh El Salvador Kuwait Pakistan Thailand
*Barbados Fiji Laos Panama *Trinidad Tobago
Belarus Germany, East *Lebanon Peru Turkey
Brazil Guam Lesotho Philippines UAE
Bulgaria Guatemala Macau Poland Ukraine
Burma Haiti Macedonia *Portugal Uruguay
Cambodia Honduras Malaysia Qatar USSR
*Canada Hong Kong Maldive Islands Romania Vietnam
China Hungary Mauritius Russia Yugoslavia
Colombia India Mexico Singapore
Costa Rica Indonesia Nepal Slovak Republic
Czech Republic Jamaica Nigeria South Africa
Czechoslovakia Japan Northern Mariana *Spain
Notes: Table displays the set of countries with which the United States negotiated quantitative restrictions on 
apparel and textile imports between 1984 and 2004. * denotes countries not subject to Specific Limits (see 
text). Source: U.S. MFA/ATC Database
Table 3: List of Countries in U.S. MFA/ATC DatabaseChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 29
MFA Group Description Segment Units
Square Meter 
Conversion
218 Yarns of different colors (cotton &/or mmf) Yarn SQM 1
219 Duck fabric (cotton &/or mmf) Yarn SQM 1
606 Non-textured filament yarn (mmf) Yarn KG 20.1
621 Impression fabric (mmf) Fabric KG 14.4
628 Twills/sateens staple/filament fiber (mmf) Fabric SQM 1
629 Other fabrics of staple/filament fiber (mmf) Fabric SQM 1
348 W&G trousers, breeches & shorts (cotton) Apparel DOZ 14.9
350 Robes, dressing gowns, etc. (cotton) Apparel DOZ 42.6
431 Gloves and mittens (wool) Apparel DPR 1.8
433 M&B suit-type coats (wool) Apparel DOZ 30.1
836 Dresses (silk or non-cotton veg. fibers) Apparel DOZ 37.9
362 Bedspreads & quilts (cotton) Made-ups NO 5.8
464 Blankets (wool) Made-ups KG 2.4
465 Floor coverings (wool) Made-ups SQM 1
665 Floor coverings (mmf) Made-ups SQM 1
Notes: Examples of MFA groups, native units and the conversion factors to square 
meters. Source: U.S. MFA/ATC Database.









China 28.4 24.9 88
Taiwan 26.3 16.6 63
Hong Kong 22.8 17.1 75
Korea, South 21.3 13.3 63
Turkey 13.0 5.7 44
Pakistan 12.4 10.3 84
Malaysia 11.0 3.8 35
Thailand 11.0 6.9 63
Indonesia 10.3 8.8 85
Philippines 9.6 6.9 72
India 8.4 7.3 87
Bangladesh 8.0 7.0 88
Egypt 7.1 1.9 27
Brazil 6.9 2.4 35
Sri Lanka 5.4 4.4 81
Singapore 3.8 1.6 43
Mexico 3.0 1.2 39
Macau 2.8 1.9 69
Dominican Republic 2.6 1.7 66
Romania 1.9 0.4 21
UAE 1.8 1.1 60
Japan 1.6 1.0 61
Jamaica 1.5 0.3 20
Colombia 1.5 0.2 10
Honduras 1.3 0.3 25
Mauritius 1.1 0.5 44
Costa Rica 1.1 0.6 51
Guatemala 0.9 0.7 73
Poland 0.9 0.1 13
Cambodia 0.9 0.8 85
Notes: Quantities are in billions of square meters. Data for 
specific limits only. Percentage filled is exports divided by 
base quota. Countries sorted by aggregate base quota 
under the MFA/ATC. Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. 
MFA/ATC Database.
Table 5: Total Speciﬁc Limit Base, Top 30 CountriesChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 31
Country
Binding Quotas - 
Liberal Definition (%)
Binding Quotas - 
Default Definition (%)
Binding Quotas - 
Conservative  Definition 
(%)
Bangladesh 89 81 75
India 76 65 57
China 72 64 55
Indonesia 73 59 50
Pakistan 67 57 47
Guatemala 67 45 32
Hong Kong 52 42 34
Macau 52 41 32
UAE 48 39 28
Philippines 53 37 30
Sri Lanka 50 36 27
Thailand 51 36 25
Cambodia 42 32 28
Korea, South 42 30 19
Taiwan 43 30 21
Dominican Republic 50 29 17
Malaysia 32 23 16
Singapore 29 22 15
Costa Rica 36 21 12
Turkey 22 18 15
Colombia 26 18 11
Mauritius 18 14 11
Brazil 16 12 8
Romania 16 11 8
Mexico 16 9 7
Egypt 12 9 6
Poland 14 8 5
Japan 10 7 3
Jamaica 5 2 1
Honduras 0 0 0
Notes: Table reports the fraction of specific limits with fill rates that exceed 80, 90 and 95 
percent, respectively. Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database.



































Notes: The Table reports the 
fraction of OTEXA categories 
exported by the country that were 
subject to specific limits from 1990-
2004. The table lists the thirty 
countries with the largest aggregate 
base quotas. Source: Authors' 
calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC 
Database.
Table 7: Fraction of Speciﬁc Limits, Top 30 CountriesChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 33











300/301 Cotton Yarns 54 52 - 12 7.2
313 Cotton Sheeting Fabric 50 93 - 70 8.6
314 Cotton Poplin / Broadcloth Fab. 51 95 - 54 4.8
315 Cotton Printcloth Fabric 67 97 - 75 8.0
*340/640 Non-Knit Shirts 69 99 64 99 12.8
347/348 Cotton Trousers 83 99 99 98 10.3
*352/652 Underwear 77 85 97 - 8.6
638/639 Mmf Knit Shirts 83 98 96 - 9.5
645/646 Mmf Sweaters 55 95 92 - 7.9
*647/648 Mmf Trousers 80 99 100 93 8.5
Notes: Table reports the average fill rates for the twenty largest MFA groups. Quantities are in billions of square 
meters. * denotes that China's quotas were negotiated on the subgroups. Authors' calculations from U.S. 
MFA/ATC Database.
Table 8: Fill Rates by OTEXA Category, Top 10 CategoriesChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 34







Log (ETE) Log (ETE)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log export
tax equivalent (see text). Column 2 includes
OTEXA category fixed effects. Significance: * 10
percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent. Source:







Table 9: Export Tax Equivalents and Fill RatesChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 35
Country


















Hong Kong 75 5
Taiwan 71 5
Korea, South 65 4
Turkey 60 2












Notes: Column 1 reports the median flexibility adjustment margin 
between 1984-2004. Column 2 displays the fraction of MFA groups 
that were subject to at least one flexibility adjustment. The table 
lists the thirty countries with the largest aggregate base quotas. 
Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. MFA/ATC Database. 


























China 9 16 -6 9 10 -1 306 288 17 271 269 2
Caribbean 47 23 24 0 0 -1 -12 -12 0 -1 1 -2
Central America 33 6 27 -10 -3 -7 6 10 -4 1 3 -2
East Asia -10 -10 0 24 24 0 57 22 36 -24 -25 0
European Union 2 3 -1 -3 -3 0 13 12 2 64 64 0
Former Soviet Union -50 -45 -5 -21 -22 1 -18 -18 0 -61 -51 -10
Middle East -34 -43 9 -1 -2 2 15 13 2 -12 -12 0
North Africa -46 -31 -15 23 23 0 -8 -27 19 -4 -4 0
North America 13 10 3 5 5 0 4 5 -1 -14 -13 -1
Oceania -42 12 -54 48 45 3 -15 -15 1 -52 -49 -3
Other Europe 102 -36 138 12 -6 18 21 -9 30 -30 -30 -1
South America -65 -58 -7 -51 -51 0 44 44 -1 -13 -12 -1
South Asia 33 33 0 18 18 0 5 3 2 20 19 0
Southeast Asia -47 8 -54 18 18 0 -13 -13 0 0 0 0
Sub-Saharan Africa -53 -42 -11 10 -25 34 69 60 9 -16 -15 -1
All Regions 3 2 1 3 3 0 31 27 4 14 14 0
All Regions (ex. China) 312 220 964- 2 - 1 0
China (2002) 42 41 1 32 21 11
All Regions (2002) 8 19 -12 14 11 3
Notes: Decomposition table reports aggregate growth, decomposed into the extensive and intensive margins, by phase and region, in year of integration. In 
this table, the integration years for Phase I-IV are for 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005, respectively. Extensive margin is defined as the net SME quantity growth in 
varieties that enter and exit in the year of integration. Intensive margin is defined as the net SME quantity growth in continuing varieties in the year of 
integration. Note that the aggregate growth values for Phase I and II differ from the previous table because this table reports values for 1995 and 1998, 
respectively. The bottom rows in each panel report Phase I and II export growth for China and all regions in 2002, the year that China was eligible for ATC 
liberalization. The sum of the intensive and extensive margin may not sum to aggregate growth due to rounding.
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Table 11: Aggregate Growth Decomposition, by Phase and RegionChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 37
Coefficients
Integration Year (2002 for Phase I-III)
x China 0.41 *** 0.00 0.93 *** 2.26 *** 1.36 *** 1.81 *** 1.28 *** 1.73 ***
0.11 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.08
x Caribbean 0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.38 -0.25 * -0.36 *** -0.30 ***
0.33 0.00 0.27 0.17 0.58 0.14 0.05 0.06
x Central America -0.26 * 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 0.30 * 0.10 -0.19 -0.26 ***
0.15 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.04
x East Asia 0.16 0.00 0.17 ** -0.68 *** 0.09 0.00 -0.22 *** -0.58 ***
0.13 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.10
x European Union 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.15 *** -0.20 ***
0.05 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.04
x Former Soviet Union 0.09 0.00 0.28 -0.07 -0.49 *** -0.22 -0.92 *** -1.14 **
0.43 0.00 0.24 0.22 0.11 0.45 0.30 0.56
x Middle East -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.11 -0.22 -0.32 *** -0.42 ***
0.25 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.16
x North Africa 0.35 0.00 0.33 *** 0.31 -0.17 *** -0.25 0.01 -0.09
0.28 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.04 0.50 0.03 0.08
x North America 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.19 -0.11 *** -0.07 *** -0.29 ** -0.20 **
0.04 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.09
x Oceania -0.26 ** 0.00 -0.17 *** -0.55 *** -0.13 0.03 -0.19 *** -0.26 ***
0.10 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.29 0.05 0.09
x Other Europe 0.06 0.00 -0.12 *** 1.72 ** -0.11 0.14 -0.02 -0.04
0.06 0.00 0.03 0.71 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.15
x South America -0.15 0.00 0.03 0.33 * 0.21 0.29 -0.14 -0.11
0.15 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.10 0.08
x South Asia 0.31 *** 0.00 0.36 *** -0.07 0.22 * 0.34 0.09 -0.08
0.10 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.37 0.11 0.09
x Southeast Asia 0.34 0.00 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.06 -0.04 -0.11
0.26 0.00 0.14 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.07 0.09
x Sub-Saharan Africa -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.16 ** 0.38 * -0.26 -0.31 ** -0.50 ***
0.14 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.12
Observations 41,100 88,818 97,482 431,069
Unbound Bound
Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product quantity on year-region-Unbound versus Bound interactions. Each column reports the
result of a regression encompassing all the products whose quotas were relaxed in the noted phase. Phase I-III report year-region fixed effects for
year 2002, the year China entered the WTO, and Phase IV reports fixed effects for 2005. Bound refer to the HS codes in which China had greater
than a 90 percent fill rate in the previous year. Standard errors clustered by exporting country. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
Unbound Bound Unbound Bound Unbound Bound
Δ Ln (SME) Δ Ln (SME) Δ Ln (SME) Δ Ln (SME)
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Table 12: ATC Phase-outs: Export Quantities and Binding QuotasChina’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 38
Kuwait (-2.89) Taiwan (-0.55) UAE (-0.26) Mozambique (0.05)
Russia (-2.81) Swaziland (-0.54) Ukraine (-0.25) Malawi (0.05)
Maldives (-2.35) Sweden (-0.52) El Salvador (-0.23) Slovakia (0.06)
Micronesia (-2.14) Ghana (-0.51) Guatemala (-0.23) Trinidad and Tobago (0.09)
Georgia (-1.99) Mali (-0.48) Gambia (-0.23) Iceland (0.09)
Guinea (-1.85) Bahrain (-0.48) Turkey (-0.23) Vietnam (0.09)
Oman (-1.82) Mauritius (-0.47) Czech Republic (-0.21) Chile (0.11)
Suriname (-1.38) Slovenia (-0.46) Lebanon (-0.21) Germany (0.12)
Cyprus (-1.35) Poland (-0.45) Nicaragua (-0.21) Cambodia (0.12)
Albania (-1.25) Venezuela (-0.45) Colombia (-0.20) Indonesia (0.13)
Kyrgyzstan (-1.24) Argentina (-0.45) Ecuador (-0.18) Bangladesh (0.15)
Kazakhstan (-1.21) Hungary (-0.44) Brunei (-0.17) Switzerland (0.16)
Azerbaijan (-1.13) Barbados (-0.40) Australia (-0.15) Armenia (0.16)
Tajikistan (-1.09) Belarus (-0.39) Brazil (-0.15) Uzbekistan (0.18)
Macedonia (Skopje) (-1.00) Malaysia (-0.39) Belgium (-0.15) Cook Islands (0.18)
South Africa (-0.98) Honduras (-0.37) Ireland (-0.14) Bolivia (0.22)
Ivory Coast (-0.91) Costa Rica (-0.36) United Kingdom (-0.14) Jordan (0.24)
Ethiopia (-0.91) Romania (-0.35) Italy (-0.13) Peru (0.24)
Syria (-0.90) Finland (-0.35) Spain (-0.13) Panama (0.25)
Moldova (-0.87) Greece (-0.35) Japan (-0.12) Botswana (0.26)
Korea, South (-0.85) Guyana (-0.34) Namibia (-0.11) Uganda (0.30)
Mongolia (-0.84) Dominican Republic (-0.34) Uruguay (-0.10) Saudi Arabia (0.32)
Nepal (-0.77) Haiti (-0.34) Portugal (-0.10) Nigeria (0.48)
Israel (-0.72) Fiji (-0.33) Croatia (-0.10) Qatar (0.51)
Singapore (-0.69) Latvia (-0.32) Estonia (-0.07) Bosnia-Hercegovina (0.63)
Zambia (-0.69) Sri Lanka (-0.31) Mexico (-0.07) Senegal (0.67)
Bermuda (-0.69) Canada (-0.31) Paraguay (-0.04) British Virgin Islands (0.69)
Sierra Leone (-0.68) Austria (-0.31) Turkmenistan (-0.04) San Marino (0.75)
Jamaica (-0.65) New Zealand (-0.31) Kenya (-0.02) Malta (0.90)
Cape Verde (-0.62) Zimbabwe (-0.30) Morocco (-0.02) Bahamas (1.35)
Hong Kong (-0.62) France (-0.30) Tanzania (0.01) Netherlands Antilles (1.60)
Belize (-0.61) Egypt (-0.29) Lithuania (0.02) Laos (1.88)
Denmark (-0.59) Norway (-0.28) Tunisia (0.02) Somalia (1.94)
Madagascar (-0.57) Philippines (-0.28) Pakistan (0.02) Tokelau (2.05)
Lesotho (-0.57) Bulgaria (-0.27) India (0.03) Mauritania (3.43)
Macao (-0.55) Thailand (-0.26) Netherlands (0.05)
Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product quantity on country-year fixed effects  on the set of China's Phase IV products that were 
subject to binding quotas in 2004. The 2005 coefficients for each country are reported in parantheses. Bold denotes that export response is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level (robust standard errors). 
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Coefficients
Integration Year
x China -0.17 -0.07 0.11 -0.54 *** -0.66 *** -0.37 *** -0.53 ***
0.10 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.03
x Caribbean -0.08 -0.10 -0.17 * -0.02
0.24 0.08 0.10 0.03
x Central America -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
0.18 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.49
x East Asia 0.07 -0.08 ** -0.17 *** -0.14 -0.01 -0.15 **
0.06 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.06
x European Union 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 * 0.05
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.13
x Former Soviet Union 0.03 -0.11 0.13 -0.09 0.16 *** 0.03
0.47 0.12 0.09 0.39 0.03 0.18
x Middle East 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.02
0.21 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.02 0.16
x North Africa 0.31 0.06 0.10 0.03
0.30 0.09 0.08 0.03
x  N o r t h  A m e r i c a 0 . 0 10 . 0 50 . 0 00 . 0 3 *
0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02
x Oceania 0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.03
0.18 0.08 0.08 0.03
x Other Europe 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 ** 0.01 0.16
0.12 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.70
x South America 0.39 ** -0.07 -0.06 0.04 ** -0.17
0.15 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.35
x South Asia 0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.15 *** -0.49 * -0.07 *** -0.20 **
0.09 0.04 0.86 0.04 0.27 0.01 0.08
x Southeast Asia 0.26 ** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** 0.12 -0.04 *** -0.14 *
0.10 0.04 0.03 0.39 0.01 0.07
x Sub-Saharan Africa 0.18 -0.16 -0.19 ** 0.07 ***
0.21 0.10 0.08 0.02
Year 2002 x China -0.14 * -0.38 *** -0.81 ***
0.08 0.05 0.13
Observations 41,100 88,818 97,482    431,069
Unbound Bound
Notes: Table regresses change in the (log of) country-product unit value on year-region-unbound versus bound interactions. Each column
reports the result of a regression encompassing all the products whose quotas were relaxed in the noted phase. Phase I, II and III report year-
region fixed effects for year 1995, 1998 and 2002, respectively. The bottom panel reports 2002 fixed effects for Phases I and II for China.
Phase IV reports fixed effects for 2005. Bound refers to the HS codes in which countries had greater than a 90 percent fill rate in the previous
year. Robust standard errors are reported. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
Unbound Bound Unbound Bound Unbound Bound
Δ Ln (Price) Δ Ln (Price) Δ Ln (Price) Δ Ln (Price)
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
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Unbound Bound Unbound Bound Unbound Bound Unbound Bound
China 0.10 * 0.49 *** 0.81 *** 0.99 *** 1.03 *** 1.01 *** 0.72 ***
0.05 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.08
ROW -0.01 0.03 -0.12 *** 0.07 ** 0.40 *** -0.03 * 0.15 ***
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02
Diff-in-Diff 0.11 ** 0.47 ** -0.29 -0.47 ***
0.05 0.21 0.26 0.11
Observations 40,186     88,415  97,106  429,488
Phase IV
Notes: Table regresses change in the country-product quality on year-region-unbound versus bound interactions. The 
procedure to estimate quality is discussed in the Appendix. Bound refer to the HS codes in which China had greater than 
a 90 percent fill rate in the previous year. Phase I-III coefficients are for 2002, the year China entered the WTO, and 
Phase IV reports 2005 coefficients. The difference-in-differences are computed as the change in China's bound and 
unbound coefficients minus the analogus difference in ROW coefficients. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 
percent.
Phase I Phase II Phase III
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MFA Groups Unit 2006 Quota 2007 Quota
2007 Quota 
Growth
Cotton fabrics kg 61,948,000 69,692,000 12.5
T-shirts no 540,204,000 594,000,000 10.0
Children's sub-limit no 45,017,000 49,518,000 10.0
Pullovers no 189,719,000 220,000,000 16.0
Men's trousers no 338,923,000 383,000,000 13.0
Blouses no 80,493,000 88,543,000 10.0
Bed linen kg 15,795,000 17,770,000 12.5
Dresses no 27,001,000 29,701,000 10.0
Brassieres no 219,882,000 248,000,000 12.8
Table & kitchen linen kg 12,349,000 13,892,000 12.5
Flax or ramie yarn kg 4,740,000 5,214,000 10.0
Table 16: EU Safeguards on China’s TC, 2006-07China’s Experience Under the MFA/ATC 42
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Exports to the U.S., 2000-2006
Figure 5: Exports to the U.S., 2000-2006, by Region